I\’m not comfortable that you call supervisors and workers \’stupid\’ just because they do might cause accidents and suffer injuries.
According to Wikipedia \’Stupidity is a lack of intelligence, understanding, reason, wit, or sense\’.
A person not having relevant information or knowledge, or failing to apply a \’standard practice\’ for unexplored reasons does not, in my opinion equate to stupid.
Similarly a person making a particular choice between 2 conflicting choices (my job? or my life?) may be ill advised but still doesn\’t fit the defintion above.
As for your last point for stronger emphasis on where the buck stops – the harmonised legislation has made that very plain. Though for mine it was a step backwards from the previous NSW standard.
Whilst an incident in and of itself is not evidence that an employer has breached their obligation to ensure safety, it\’s a strong indicator that probably not enough had been done to prevent the injury.
The buck stops with the employer (PCBU) who has the control of resources and has the most to gain from the human resource at risk. Whereas the worker has the most to lose and least control over their situation

I think it is also significant that the new Rail Safety Act being introduced gradually in most Australian States has a legislative obligation to operate a \”safety culture\”. How that will be assessed or policed will be fascinating, to take Tony\’s perspective above.

I agree with Yossi\’s call for a new approach but we must understand the flaws in the existing approach, flaws which this article tried to discuss.

This is precisely the message I have been sharing for years in my workplace presentation – Reflections.

Safety has a lot less to do with safety laws, procedures and systems than it does about how we perceive its value. What is a life worth? Is there a dollar value or is it about family and children and futures? If there is a genuine \’will\’ then the way to do it is a fairly easy path to find. If change is brought about by force, one tends to do only what is required – and that is often not enough – the mindset is wrong.

It\’s rather interesting how those who have experienced trauma and loss often know all this. Books and pages of academic material will never replace what we are all naturally gifted with. Furthermore, this does not come dripping in cost and expensive procedure. It just needs to be delivered with heart and conviction. It requires directors and management to stand by its commitment – because talking the talk is not the same as walking the walk.

The other side of that coin is of course the competition — human vs profit. Our fair trading system is shot to pieces. The WTO and our own governments conveniently ignore the terrible global abuse of human (worker) rights – as a result we can\’t compete….oh really who cares? It\’s the blind leading the blind.

I base my position on this: If you take the broad view of section 19 of the harmonised act, and the subordinate responsibility sections following, the employer (PCBU) is to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of (subsection 1) workers and (subsection 2) others.
Everything esle following this responisbility and in the regs are informative statements providing examples and minimum standards.
So for instance, subsection (3) includes, but does not limit, aspects of the PCBU business that MUST be considered in ensuring safety.
Then Part 5 establishes the grounds for consultation on matters affecting persons in the workplace.

The requirements set out in the subordinate regulation simply provide for more detailed minimum standards – Eg: chapter 5 – specific requirements for establishing consultation, and Chapter 3 Part 3.1 specific requirements to establish an approach to risk management that must be followed by all PCBUs.

All sections following this, regarding specific risks, again only provide for minimum standards and SHOULD NOT be considered as the ONLY hazards that must be adressed.

Hence a true compliance model would:
1: establish consultation;
2: establish risk management processes and how they are to applied at the worksite;
3: assess the sections of the regualtion following Chapter 3 Part 3.1, and assess the relevant (WorkCover approved) Codes of Practice (applicable across all affected industries and organisations), to identify applicable issues and minimum standards for addressing them at specific worksites,
4: assess the specifics of
a: the industry and
b: the organisaiton and
c: the worksite
for hazards not otherwise idenitfied in the regulation. NOTE: This is where industry specific codes of practice and Australian Standards play a large part in meeting minimum standards. But there must also be organisation (and even worksite) specific procedures for addressing hazards specific to the organisaiton and/or worksite that are not addressed by any of the Act or subordinate documents listed here.

I agree that simple compliance with JUST the requirements for consultation and hazards listed in the regulation ≠ compliance with the broader requirements of the act.

But compliance with the broader requirments of the act, following the 4 layers I\’ve set out = compliance, and should go a long way to = Safety as well.

I\’ve found that this approach has served me well for over 15 years. In 20+ years I have been involved with multiple industries and organisations and, in that time, have only had 4 incidents to date that needed to be reported to WorkCover and have never had stronger adverse action than Improvement Notices in 2 of those incidents.
One involved an electric, ride-on, pallet jack reversing off the side of a tailgate loader, resulted in the battery pack landing on the knees of the operator.
The other involved entanglement in a chain and sprocket drive resulting in amputation of two finger tips.
The other two reported incidents involved:
1: an electric shock due to an abraded power cord making a small machine \’live\’.
2: A crane malfunction resulted in a crucible of molten iron tipped over a foundry floor.

And in my current role (2 1/4 years now) this approach has achieved a 60% reduction in average cost of claims and approximately 45% reduction in compensable injuries.

So from this, seeking to meet compliance has, in the main, = improved safety.

You can put any amount of legislation in place but if you don\’t fund the \”policing\” even at the most basic level safety is dead in the water.

As Yossi Berger has said there needs to be completely new shift in strategy to really float the safety boat. We have researched the topic to death and chewed the safety bone to the marrow without much result so the emphasis must now shift to an entirely different model that is enthusiastically engaged by employers – expend our efforts in that area and results will flow \” Its a money matter \”